A child who was eight when Britain voted to leave the European Union is eighteen today. For a young person in Malta considering a British university, the most consequential words to come out of yesterday’s summit in Brussels may be the six months London and Brussels have given themselves to agree on tuition fees. A place at university can be offered, a language shared and a family connection strong. The figure on the offer letter can still decide where that young person spends the next three years. GOV.UK
That is one place to begin thinking about the reversal of Brexit. Another is with Andy Burnham, the British Prime Minister, who has put the possibility of rejoining the Union back into national debate. His government remains committed for this Parliament to staying outside the EU, the single market and the customs union, and to maintaining the end of free movement. Yet a British prime minister is now prepared to ask publicly whether those arrangements should survive the next election. In Brussels, Burnham described the latest agreement as probably the limit of what he could achieve before then. He also envisaged an informal discussion with the EU in about a year about what might follow. The distinction matters. Britain has reopened a political question. Accession negotiations would require a separate decision. GOV.UK
The summit of 20 November gives that debate something it has often lacked. There are now specific decisions against which people can judge the value and the price of closer ties. London and Brussels concluded negotiations on easing barriers to trade in food and agricultural products, linking their carbon markets and creating a reciprocal youth scheme. The last of these would allow up to 100,000 young people from each side to spend up to three years on the other side, including for work, study or volunteering. The timetable is instructive. The parties aim to apply the agreement by 2028 and to make opportunities available by January 2030 at the latest. A generation that came of age after the referendum will have to wait a little longer to use what its leaders have agreed. GOV.UK
Each agreement exposes a different aspect of sovereignty. Consider a small British food producer deciding whether to take an order from a customer in Europe. The owner can put a price on certification, on a delayed consignment and on the hours spent completing paperwork for a modest sale. A minister also has to put a value on Parliament’s freedom to change the rules under which that food is produced. Both calculations are legitimate. The difficulty arises when the minister claims the freedom on behalf of the country while the producer quietly absorbs the cost. There is an equally awkward question for those who favour closer ties. If Britain expects its producers to follow European rules for the foreseeable future, how much does it value having a vote when those rules are written? The food agreement makes that question harder to postpone. apnews.com
Public opinion leaves room for several answers. Research published by British Future in September found that 46 per cent would vote to rejoin and 29 per cent would stay outside. A quarter were undecided. In the same research, 57 per cent supported a reciprocal youth mobility scheme and only 12 per cent opposed it. A voter can reasonably want her son to take a job in Milan, want fewer checks on a delivery from France and still have doubts about EU membership. Equally, someone who voted Leave in 2016 is entitled to conclude, after ten years of experience, that the bargain was a poor one. A serious public debate owes both people the courtesy of asking what they think now. British Future
From Malta, there is a further difficulty with the word reversal. It makes a decision involving a continent sound like something Britain can do to itself. Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, a British application would require unanimous agreement in the Council, the consent of the European Parliament and ratification of the accession treaty by every contracting state. Malta would have a decision to make, as would Ireland, Poland and every other member. Each would be entitled to ask what Britain intended to contribute and whether the commitment could endure a change of government in Westminster. Britain knows from its own experience how much can turn on a single election. Its neighbours know it too. EUR-Lex
There is a genuine uncertainty in where the present course leads. If the agreements work well, British voters may conclude that a close partnership from outside gives them much of what they want. The same agreements could produce the opposite judgement. As more decisions are taken jointly, the absence of British ministers and elected representatives from the institutions that set European policy may become harder to defend. Both outcomes are plausible. Much will depend on ordinary experience. Does the exporter recover a customer? Can a family afford the university place? When a shared rule needs changing, who is answerable to the people who live with it?
By 2050, the child who was eight in June 2016 will be forty-two. She may have children of her own weighing where to study, work or settle. She will have lived most of her adult life with a European settlement that others chose before she had a vote. The democratic obligation of this generation of leaders is to give hers a meaningful choice about what follows. That requires candour from those who would keep Britain outside about the costs of distance, and equal candour from those who would take it back in about the obligations of belonging.
Yesterday’s summit leaves that choice open. Its achievement is modest enough to be believed. A British prime minister and his European counterparts have begun to spell out what they are prepared to do together again. For the eighteen-year-old in Malta, the first convincing answer will arrive when she opens the offer letter and can afford to say yes.

